



EXPLANATION < JUSTIFICATION: GDPR AND THE PERILS 
OF PRIVACY 
   TALIA B. GILLIS AND JOSH SIMONS† 
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
is the most comprehensive legislation yet enacted to govern algorithmic 
decision-making. Its reception has been dominated by a debate about 
whether it contains an individual right to an explanation of algorithmic 
decision-making. We argue that this debate is misguided in both the 
concepts it invokes and in its broader vision of accountability in modern 
democracies. It is justification that should guide approaches to governing 
algorithmic decision-making, not simply explanation. The form of 
justification – who is justifying what to whom – should determine the 
appropriate form of explanation. This suggests a sharper focus on 
systemic accountability, rather than technical explanations of models to 
isolated, rights-bearing individuals. We argue that the debate about the 
governance of algorithmic decision-making is hampered by its excessive 
focus on privacy. Moving beyond the privacy frame allows us to focus on 
institutions rather than individuals and on decision-making systems rather 
than the inner workings of algorithms. Future regulatory provisions 
should develop mechanisms within modern democracies to secure 
systemic accountability over time in the governance of algorithmic 
decision-making systems. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
is the most comprehensive legislation yet enacted to govern algorithmic 
decision-making. Its scope is supra-national, shaping the data protection 
practices of companies operating throughout the world’s most 
prosperous integrated economic area. It establishes enforcement 
mechanisms with bite, threatening companies with fines of up to 4 
percent of global turnover for the most serious violations. Yet the 
GDPR’s focus is not decision-making, but privacy. This is the product 
of history. The primary protagonists of current debates about governing 
algorithmic decision-making are privacy scholars. We believe this 
privacy lens has distorted interpretations of the GDPR’s approach to 
governing algorithmic decision-making. That approach reaches beyond 
an individual right to explanation, to establish provisions that aim to 
build systemic accountability over time.  
This paper examines those provisions. We explore the tools the 
GDPR provides for ensuring that institutions justify their use of 
algorithmic decision-making systems, to both regulators and individuals 
subject to their decisions. Our aim is not simply to interpret the GDPR, 
though we side with scholars who argue that the main text of the GDPR 
must be read in conjunction with surrounding ‘soft-law’, including the 
Recitals, Article 29 Working Party (A29WP) guidance, and the 
interpretations of authorities mandated with enforcing its provisions.1 
Rather, our aim is to step back and examine the concepts that underpin 
the right to explanation debate, and the broader challenge of regulating 
algorithmic decision-making. We make three arguments.  
 
1 See Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons From the GDPR's Approach to 
Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), at 48; Margot E. Kaminski, 
The Right to Explanation, Explained, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 197-199 (2019); Bryan 
Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s ‘Right to Explanation’ Debate and 
the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143 (2019). 
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First, we argue that accountability is the foundational goal that 
should guide approaches to governing algorithmic decision-making. 
Accountability is achieved when an institution must justify its choices 
about how it developed and implemented its decision-making 
procedure, including the use of statistical techniques or machine 
learning, to an individual or institution with meaningful powers of 
oversight and enforcement. Accountability produces instrumental 
benefits, including encouraging the use of decision-making procedures 
that are consistent and verifiable, and providing mechanisms for 
identifying and addressing discrimination and injustice.2 However, we 
argue that accountability is the foundational goal because of its intrinsic, 
rather than its instrumental value. Accountability is constitutive of 
democratic self-governance. It is part of what it means for a citizenry to 
authorize in an ongoing way the complex decision-making systems 
whose recommendations shape their lives. Other goals discussed in the 
literature are all in some way means to securing accountability. 
Individual explanations of algorithmic systems are valuable if and when 
they enable institutions to justify those systems to individuals and 
regulators, but they may not always further this end.3 Transparency may 
be necessary for some forms of accountability, but neither constitutes 
nor is entirely sufficient for accountability.4 In other words, 
accountability requires justification and justification requires 
explanation. The form of each should determine the form of the others. 
Second, we distinguish between different forms of justification 
required to attain systemic accountability and consider the appropriate 
form of explanation in each. Recent scholarship has debated whether a 
right to an explanation exists in the GDPR, and if so, what its content 
might be. We argue that the form this explanation should take must 
depend on the form of accountability being pursued. By separating out 
different forms of justification, we set out how a ‘right to explanation’ 
(a “RtE”) might further the aim of accountability, and how it might 
 
2  Jeremy Waldron, Accountability: Fundamental to Democracy 26 (NYU Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 14-13, Apr. 2014), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2410812; MATTHEW V. FLINDERS, THE POLITICS OF 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE MODERN STATE (Aldershot: Ashgate 2001); ADAM PRZEWORSKI, 
SUSAN CAROL STOKES, AND BERNARD MANIN, DEMOCRACY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
REPRESENTATION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
3 See, e.g., Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of Explainable 
Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085 (2018).  
4 See generally  Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing without Knowing: Limitations of 
the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & 
SOC'Y 973 (2016); Tal Z. Zarsky, Transparent Predictions, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1503, 1530 
(2013). 
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hinder it. We argue that the technical explanation of a statistical or 
machine learning model is not sufficient for an institution to justify its 
decision-making procedure. Furthermore, we argue that such a technical 
explanation may even distract from the most important provisions of the 
GDPR for securing systemic accountability.5 These include two crucial 
components. First, a range of mechanisms for ensuring that institutions 
justify their choices in the design and implementation of algorithmic 
decision-making systems – the critical ex ante stage in machine learning 
– including their broader policy and commercial aims. Second, that 
these mechanisms ensure justifications are offered to regulators with the 
necessary information, resources and powers, not simply isolated, 
rights-bearing individuals with limited information and expertise. 
Third, we argue that the GDPR’s focus on privacy underpins some 
of its most significant limits. We identify three such limits, some of 
which are about the law itself, others about recent interpretations of the 
law. First, recent interpretations of the law mistakenly focus on the 
actual algorithms and machine learning models, rather than the broader 
policy and commercial environment in which they are deployed. The 
aims an institution has in designing and implementing an algorithmic 
decision-making system shape the workings of the algorithm or model 
itself, but receive far less attention, at least in the interpretive literature. 
Second, the law itself is constrained by its focus on individual rights. 
Machine learning, the most common form of algorithmic decision-
making, makes information about the design and implementation about 
the overall system critical to exercising meaningful oversight. 
Information about individual decisions will not enable individuals to 
grasp of the nature of the system whose decisions shape their lives, or 
enhance their capacity to demand a justification from the powerful 
institutions that designed it. For related reasons, the notice and consent 
framework is not an adequate mechanism by which to ensure 
meaningful institutional accountability. Third, the GDPR and the 
literature surrounding it have no satisfactory account of how its 
provisions are to be subject to democratic oversight. Accountability 
matters because it is constitutive of democratic self-government. Future 
regulatory provisions must focus more directly on developing 
mechanisms within modern democracies that can secure accountability 
in the governance of algorithmic decision-making systems. 
 
5 See, e.g., Lillian Edwards & Michael Veale, Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an 
Explanation’ Is Probably Not the Remedy You Are Looking For, 16 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 19,  
65-67 (2017); Lilian Edwards & Michael Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm: From a "Right to an 
Explanation" to a "Right to Better Decisions"?, 16 IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 46, 50 (2018). 
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The paper proceeds in two sections. The first contains our conceptual 
argument. We begin by arguing that accountability is the foundational 
goal that should guide approaches to governing algorithmic decision-
making. Explanations are instrumentally valuable insofar as they enable 
the process of giving and receiving justifications that constitutes 
accountability in a democracy. The second draws out the implications 
of this argument for interpreting the GDPR and for approaches to 
governing algorithmic decision-making more broadly. We focus 
specifically on machine learning in this paper. Though we are interested 
more broadly in governance approaches to algorithmic decision-
making, focusing specifically on machine learning draws attention to 
the most acute practical and theoretical challenges. We focus our 
discussion on governing the use of machine learning in the private rather 
than the public sector. 
We end by setting out some of the ways in which the limits to recent 
interpretations of the GDPR are related to their framing in terms of 
privacy. The challenges we face when developing governance systems 
for algorithmic decision-making go beyond concerns that can usefully 
be understood in terms of privacy. 
I. EXPLANATION  JUSTIFICATION  ACCOUNTABILITY  
This section outlines our conceptual argument. First, we argue that 
accountability is the foundational goal. It should guide our 
interpretations of the GDPR. It should also drive the questions we pose, 
and the answers we advance, as we confront the broader task of 
developing a comprehensive approach to governing algorithmic 
decision-making. Second, we consider the implications this has for the 
other concepts invoked in the debate about whether a right to 
explanation exists in the GDPR (hereafter the RtE debate). The most 
obvious is explanation itself, providing explanations of the logic of a 
machine learning model to ensure that its operation is, in some way, 
comprehensible to external human observers. Explanations are said to 
be valuable because there is something inherently important about 
individuals understanding the systems to which they are subject, that is, 
because they respect individual autonomy; and also because such 
understanding is instrumentally important, for individuals to challenge 
decisions or to identify bias and discrimination.6 We argue that 
 
6 See Gianclaudio Malgieri & Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated 
Decision-Making Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 INT'L DATA PRIV. L. 243, 
250 (2017); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 40-46. 
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explanations of machine learning models are valuable if and when they 
are a means to provide justifications of the broader decision-making 
procedure. What matters is justifying why the rules are the way they are; 
explaining what the rules are must further this end. 
The focus on individual, technical explanations has been driven by 
an uncritical bent towards transparency. Transparency is thought to 
matter because to see is to know, and knowledge is power.  Transparency 
provides the information required for governance and oversight.7 This 
is a mistake. Like explanation, transparency is an instrumental good. 
Transparency matters if and when it is required to further the aim of 
systemic accountability. These concepts are important not only for the 
RtE debate, but for thinking more broadly about the central aims that 
should guide any approach to governing algorithmic decision-making. 
This section aims to make progress towards such conceptual clarity.  
A. Accountability 
Accountability, we submit, is the foundational concept. It is the 
motivation that drives arguments for transparency and for various forms 
of explanation in machine learning. It should be the central aim of all 
approaches to governing decision-making using machine learning. It is 
therefore important to be clear about what accountability is and why it is 
valuable.  
Accountability is about vertical power. Accountability empowers those 
who might otherwise be powerless, demanding that those who wield 
power over them offer an account of their conduct. In the modern world, 
its most familiar form is democratic accountability, in which those who 
control the apparatus of well-organized territorial states must offer an 
account of their conduct to citizens subject to their power. Democratic 
accountability, as Jeremy Waldron puts it, confers “authority on those who 
are otherwise powerless over those who are well endowed with power.”8 
More generally, accountability can be said to pertain in the following 
structure. Party A is accountable to party B with respect to its conduct C, 
if A has an obligation to provide B with some justification for C, and may 
face some form of sanction if B finds A’s justification to be inadequate.9 
 
7 See Ananny & Crawford, supra note 4, at 974-977; Zarsky, supra note 4, at 1533; See 
generally, DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998). 
8 See Waldron, supra note 2. 
9 See Reuben Binns, Algorithmic Accountability and Public Reason, 31 PHIL. & TECH. 543, 
544 (2018); see generally MARK BOVENS ET AL., THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY (2014). 
77                JOURNAL OF LAW & INNOVATION [Vol. 2: 71 
This is the principal-agent of accountability.10 Accountability requires 
an agent, such as rulers, to justify their conduct to a principal, such as an 
electorate, subject to sanction through a range of mechanisms, most 
obviously, elections. The agent’s exercise of power is shaped by the 
knowledge of the principal’s inevitable judgement. Accountability ensures 
that those with power must justify their decisions to those who they will 
affect. Much like the threat of punishment, the idea is that this will change 
the behaviour of those decision-makers for the better.11 To apply this view 
of accountability to decision-making procedures that use machine 
learning, let us suppose accountability pertains when: An institution (Party 
A) must justify its choices about how it developed and implemented its 
decision-making procedure (Conduct C), including the use of statistical 
techniques or machine learning, to an individual or institution with 
meaningful powers of oversight and enforcement (Party B).  
Accountability can secure a range of instrumental benefits. It 
encourages institutions to use decision-making procedures that are 
consistent and verifiable, as consistency and verifiability tend to make for 
more persuasive justifications. It encourages institutions to identify 
discrimination in their decision-making procedures, and where possible, 
to address it in the design stage.12 Structures of accountability can 
incentivize institutions to develop decision-making procedures with more 
care, consider a broad range of interests and perspectives, and evaluate 
more kinds of risk and possible harms.13 
But accountability is about more than power. Part of the value of 
accountability is that it changes the conduct of those with power because 
they know that conduct will have to be justified. However, the more 
fundamental value of accountability is intrinsic. It is constitutive of 
democratic self-governance.14 A king might fear the judgement of his 
 
10 This has been the dominant view of accountability explored in political science and 
political economy for the past two decades. See generally PRZEWORSKI ET AL., supra note 2; 
James D. Fearon, Self-Enforcing Democracy, 126 Q.J. ECON. 1661 (2011); FLINDERS, supra 
note 2; KAARE STRØM, WOLFGANG C. MÜLLER, AND TORBJÖRN BERGMAN, DELEGATION AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY IN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACIES (2003). 
11 ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 3 (2001). 
12 Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 42, 55. 
13 See Binns, supra note 9, at 547; Zarsky, supra note 4, at 1530-1550. 
14 This is part of Jeremy Waldron’s argument, drawing on several recent critiques of the 
narrowness of the principal-agent approach to accountability, and considering its relationship to 
democracy more broadly. Waldron, supra note 2. See also JOHAN P. OLSEN, DEMOCRATIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY, POLITICAL ORDER, AND CHANGE: EXPLORING ACCOUNTABILITY 
PROCESSES IN AN ERA OF EUROPEAN TRANSFORMATION (2017); CRAIG T. BOROWIAK, 
ACCOUNTABILITY & DEMOCRACY: THE PITFALLS AND PROMISE OF POPULAR CONTROL 
(2011); Alexander H. Trechsel, Reflexive Accountability and Direct Democracy, 33 W. EUR. 
POL. 1050 (2010). 
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subjects. He might fear rebellion or resistance. The anticipation of that 
rebellion or resistance might shape the decisions he makes. But this is not 
accountability. The King need not justify his decisions; he has no 
obligation to offer an account of the decisions he has made, or his reasons 
for making them, to his subjects. Whereas in a democracy, as Waldron 
argues, “the accountable agents of the people owe the people an account 
of what they have been doing, and a refusal to provide this is simple 
insolence.”15  
Accountability is part of the practice of modern democracy. The giving 
and receiving of justifications is part of what it means to jointly govern 
ourselves. The agents who give and receive justifications are varied: 
sometimes individual citizens justify what they do or decide to other 
individual citizens, sometimes institutions justify what they do or decide 
to individual citizens, sometimes institutions justify what they do or decide 
to other institutions.16 The content of their justifications might be varied 
too, including important decision-making processes and procedures that 
shape the lives of citizens. This broader view of accountability extends 
beyond the public realm. The most obvious form of accountability in a 
democracy is certainly the justification by public bodies of their conduct 
to citizens. But the rules and procedures that shape our collective future 
go far beyond those authored in the public realm. We expect companies 
who deliver important services to justify their decisions and procedures, 
to us as citizens, and to governments as our representatives. Facebook 
must justify how it moderates content to Congress.17 Its content 
moderation system profoundly shapes how we interact as citizens; 
decisions about how that system works are of public concern; therefore, 
Facebook must justify those decisions to us, the public, or to our 
representatives.   
Democracy and accountability are not, however, the same thing.18 
There may actually be important tensions between democracy and 
accountability. Mechanisms for accountability are often solutions to the 
problem of control – they need not, and often are not, democratic. Central 
banks and financial regulators are institutions of accountability, that is, 
 
15 Waldron, supra note 2, at 28. 
16 We side with Waldron on this point: whether the justification is offered or received by an 
individual, a multitude, or a legal corporation doesn’t matter as much as some suppose. Id. 
17 See Kate Klonick, Facebook Released Its Content Moderation Rules. Now What?, N.Y. 
TIMES (April 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/26/opinion/facebook-content-
moderation-rules.html. 
18 Mechanisms of accountability may actually change how we do democracy. If 
accountability changes democracy, the two cannot be synonymous. See generally OLSEN, supra 
note 14; Trechsel, supra note 14. 
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they solve the problem of control, but they are not democratic. 
Environmental regulators are institutions of accountability, but they are 
not democratic. As Borowiak puts it, “accountability institutions can 
create veils of legitimacy that mask abuses and dampen the critical and 
participatory energies of the public. So doing, they can end up thwarting 
citizen control rather than enhancing it.”19 These are important issues, but 
we want to put them aside. The challenge of ensuring that institutions of 
accountability do not erode the possibilities of democratic action and 
legitimacy is critical to the future of democracy in increasingly complex 
societies and economies, but it is a separate challenge to thinking 
systematically about accountability and what is required to achieve it.   
Accountability, then, is the foundational concept. What follows, we 
believe, is that transparency must be put in its proper place. Transparency 
is valuable insofar as it furthers the aim of accountability.20 The conditions 
in which transparency furthers this aim are more limited than it is often 
supposed. Demands for transparency tend to assume that if people are 
provided with the necessary information, they will take action against 
decisions they think are wrong. The GDPR, for example, requires 
individuals to be provided with “meaningful information about the logic 
involved” in the automated decision21 as part of the right to contest these 
decisions22 and to enforce other rights under the GDPR.23 
There are good reasons to be deeply skeptical about the connection 
between the provision of information to individuals and those individuals 
taking desired actions. Firstly, people have to understand the information 
they receive. There is ample evidence that people struggle with even 
simple and straightforward disclosures,24 let alone disclosure that pertains 
to more technical aspects of automated decision-making. Second, people 
 
19 See BOROWIAK, supra note 14, at 179. 
20 See, e.g., Ananny and Crawford, supra note 4; Adrian Weller, Challenges for 
Transparency, CORNELL UNIV. (July 29, 2017), http://arxiv.org/abs/1708.01870; Danielle 
Citron, What to Do about the Emerging Threat of Censorship Creep on the Internet, CATO INST. 
(November 28, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/what-do-about-
emerging-threat-censorship-creep-internet. 
21 Namely Article 13(2)(f), Article 14(2)(g) and Article 15(1)(g). Regulation (EU) 2016/679 
of the European Parliament and the Council of April 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural 
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such 
Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 
119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].  
22 GDPR art. 22. 
23 See discussion in Andrew D. Selbst & Julia Powles, Meaningful Information and the 
Right to Explanation, 7 INT. DATA PRIV. L. 233 (2017) (showing the connection between 
providing information and individuals enforcing their rights).  
24 See discussion in Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence 
Based Policy, 28 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 50 (2015).  
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must understand how that information relates to their particular 
circumstances and preferences. Many years of research on the effect of 
information disclosure, in multiple realms, demonstrate that there is a 
significant gap between the promise of disclosures and their actual 
impact.25 The drive towards transparency often produces legal and policy 
regimes that fail to achieve genuine accountability over time. 
Accountability should be the central aim of all approaches to governing 
decision-making using machine learning. The giving and receiving of 
justifications is part of what it means for a citizenry to authorise in an 
ongoing way the complex decision-making systems whose 
recommendations shape their lives. 
B. Explanation < Justification 
We now turn to the central concept in the RtE debate, on which most 
interpretations of the GDPR have focused: explanation. On the face of it, the 
role of explanation in our notion of accountability seems obvious. 
Accountability requires justification and justification requires explanation. 
To justify a decision-making procedure that involves or is constituted by a 
machine learning model, an individual subject to that decision-making 
procedure requires an explanation of how the machine learning model 
works. This is the thought that underpins much of the RtE debate.  
But let’s pause for a moment to ask: What form of explanation does 
justification require? Think of an example. Suppose you are involved in a 
major car crash that leaves you paralyzed from the waist down. After you 
wake up in hospital, you ask: Why did I crash? The crash investigator 
helpfully left a report by the side of your bed. It explains: The velocity of 
your car produced a centrifugal force on your wheel hub, which, gradually 
produced a rotating motion on your wheel stud which, in turn, loosened your 
front left wheel from your chassis. The resulting force made your vehicle 
swerve to the left. The particles of the central barrier then came into contact 
 
25 See generally ARCHON FUNG ET AL., FULL DISCLOSURE: THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF 
TRANSPARENCY (2007); Lauren Willis, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the 
Quest for Consumer Comprehension, 3 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 74 (2017); OMRI 
BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF 
MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of 
Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Ryan Bubb, TMI? Why the Optimal 
Architecture of Disclosure Remains TBD, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1021 (2015); Matthew A. Edwards, 
Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure: Socio-Economics and the Quest 
for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 199, 229 (2004). For further analysis of 
the ideology underlying calls for transparency, see David E. Pozen, Transparency’s Ideological 
Drift, 128 YALE L.J. 100 (2018) (arguing that transparency has shifted from an idea that 
promotes a stronger and more egalitarian regulatory state, to a tool aimed at limiting government 
intervention and regulation). 
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with the polymers on the left side of your vehicle. The molecular structure 
of the polymer was broken on the driver’s side, rapidly reducing the speed 
of your vehicle and eventually bringing it to a halt. This explanation is 
clearly unsatisfactory. It’s an explanation at the wrong level. It answers your 
‘why’ question with an account of microphysics. You want to know why 
your wheel came off. The explanation might be true, but it is beside the 
point. What you really want is for Ford to justify why your wheel came off 
despite having serviced your vehicle last month. What matters is the 
justification that is part of the process of accountability. The form of 
explanation involved in that justification depends on the context. If Ford 
sent you an account of the microphysics of your crash, you would consider 
that not just a misunderstanding about the information you require, but an 
evasion of accountability. It represents a failure to justify what happened.  
The RtE debate often conceives of explanations at completely the wrong 
level. More precisely, at a level that is simply not relevant to justification, 
and therefore, to accountability. To those subject to the decisions of a 
machine learning model, offering an explanation of a machine learning 
model is a little like offering an account of microphysics to explain a car 
crash. Explanations of machine learning models are certainly not sufficient 
for many of the most important forms of justification in modern 
democracies, and often, they may not even be necessary. More specifically, 
what form of explanation is necessary, including whether a technical 
explanation of the machine learning model is necessary, depends on who is 
justifying what to whom. This implies two important shifts in focus. First, 
in terms of what is being justified. The focus should be on how institutions 
justify their choices about the design and integration of machine learning 
models into their decision-making systems, rather than on what the rules 
governing a model’s operation are. What matters is why the rules of an 
algorithm are what they are.26 Second, in terms of to whom the justification 
is being offered. Institutions should justify their choices about the design 
and integration of machine learning models not to individuals, but to 
empowered regulators or other forms of public oversight bodies. Less 
emphasis should be placed on the rights of disempowered and isolated 
individuals, who are expected to understand the complicated models to 
whose decisions they are subject, and more on systemic accountability – the 
way power is structured between institutions. If accountability is the 
foundational goal, what is required is institutional justification, not 
algorithmic explanation. Algorithmic explanation can be necessary to 
institutional justification. But since it is justification that is necessary for 
accountability, and it is accountability that is of ultimate importance, the 
 
26 Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3. 
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form of institutional justification should determine the appropriate form of 
explanation. 
The excessive focus on technical forms of explanation is itself the result 
of an uncritical bent towards transparency. This is partly the product of 
history. Much of the policy and legal debate about the governance of 
machine learning has developed from older debates about privacy. Many 
scholars who were previously privacy experts now write about the 
governance of artificial intelligence. The GDPR is framed as a privacy law, 
even though its focus reaches far beyond the confines of privacy.27 The 
transparency bent, with all its pitfalls, has been unreflectively transposed 
from the privacy literature to the literature on explanation and 
interpretability.28 The risk is that the limits of the transparency debate swiftly 
become limits to the debate about how we should integrate machine learning 
models into some of our most important social, economic and political 
institutions. The most important limit is the focus on individual rights, rather 
than on structures of power. The privacy debate has always been hemmed 
in by its focus on individual consent, a concept that has proved to be a 
mirage in theory and in practice.29 As a result, it has overlooked more 
fundamental and intractable challenges about how institutions should hold 
one another to account, most notably, involving questions about the 
structure and distribution of power. If individual-understanding-of-
machine-learning-models becomes the new individual-consent-to-the-use-
of-their-data, we should expect a wholesale failure to hold to account the 
institutions that use machine learning for their own ends.  
This uncritical bent towards transparency, and the subsequent focus on 
technical explanation, actually suits many of the most powerful actors in the 
internet age. The focus on algorithmic explanation can deflect from the need 
for institutional justification. Consider an example. To satisfy increasing 
calls for oversight and accountability in content moderation, suppose 
Facebook rolls out a new interactive tool. This tool allows individual users 
to interact with their News Feed, to understand the factors that ‘explain’ why 
they see particular pieces of content. Users would be able to change 
important parameters about themselves, such as their gender, race, or 
 
27 For instance, much of the literature about explanation in law is published in journals that 
are putatively about privacy. See generally Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra 
note 5. 
28 See generally  BRIN, supra note 7; Will Thomas Devries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital 
Age, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 283–311 (2003); Joshua A. T. Fairfield & Christoph Engel, 
Privacy as a Public Good, 65 DUKE L.J. 385, 385–457 (2016). 
29 Lothar Determann, Social Media Privacy: A Dozen Myths and Facts, 16 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 1, 7-10 (2012); Dan Svirsky, Why Are Privacy Preferences Inconsistent? 15 (JOHN M. 
OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON., & BUS. FELLOWS’ DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES, HARV. LAW SCH., 
Discussion Paper No. 81, 2018).  
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location, but also their behaviour on Facebook, such as what groups they 
have liked, or what publishers they read, and see how their News Feed 
changes. No doubt many users would feel Facebook had discharged its 
responsibility to explain how News Feed works. But this is not satisfactory. 
To the question “Why do I see what I see?”, the tool effectively says “Well, 
if you were African American and not white, you’d see this; if you were 
female and not male, you’d see this; if you were from California and not 
Wisconsin, you’d see this; if you had a lower proportion of photos that 
contained cats, you’d see this”, and so on. By implication, it says: “You see 
this because you are a white male from Wisconsin who likes cats.” That 
explanation may be true. It may even enable a user to develop an intuitive 
picture of how Facebook’s News Feed ranking systems work (though we 
are sceptical even of that, since that intuitive picture applies only to their 
case and may not generalize).30  But it is nonetheless beside the point. The 
individual wants to know why Facebook chose to construct its News Feed 
ranking system in the way it did. Why are engagement and relevance the 
primary metrics, and how are they defined? What are the other principles on 
the basis of which content is promoted and demoted on News Feed? They 
want Facebook to justify its News Feed ranking system. The kind of 
explanation this requires is on the level of choices and principles in the 
design of content moderation systems, not of interpretable machine learning 
models. Such technical explanations can actually distract from the 
appropriate form of justification. Citizens feel they no longer need to press 
for answers to the harder, but more fundamental question: Why do you 
distribute information in this way?  
The posing of these questions by citizens, and the answering of them by 
institutions, is essential to the functioning of modern democracies. For large 
internet companies in particular, the drive towards transparency, cashed out 
in the form of the search for interpretable machine learning models, 
represents a welcome distraction from a fundamental debate about their own 
powers and purposes. The danger is that we make the same mistake in 
explanation and interpretability as we have in privacy: individual 
‘understanding’ of a model takes the role ‘consent’ is supposed to play in 
securing important forms of institutional accountability. Individual 
understanding may often be just as much of an illusion as individual 
consent.31 
 
30 Along the lines of the kind of interactive explanation systems about which Edwards and 
Veale are more optimistic. See generally Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm, supra note 
5. 
31 See generally Lilian Edwards, Privacy, Law, Code and Social Networking Sites, 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET (2013); Rikke Frank 
Joergensen, The Unbearable  Lightness of User Consent, 3 INTERNET POL'Y REV. (2014); 
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Accountability is constitutive of democratic self-governance. It is part of 
what it means for citizens to authorise in an ongoing way the complex 
decision-making procedures to which they are subject. Accountability 
requires that an institution justify its choices for the design and 
implementation of its decision-making procedures, including the use of 
statistical techniques and machine learning, to an individual or institution 
with meaningful powers of oversight and enforcement. The right form of 
explanation can be crucial to the giving and receiving of that justification. 
The wrong form can unintentionally or intentionally undermine it. Technical 
explanations of machine learning models can further the aim of institutional 
justification, and therefore of accountability. But they can also undermine 
and distract from it. The form of explanation should depend on the form of 
accountability. Institutional context should drive the form of explanation 
offered. We cannot simply adopt technical solutions to explanation without 
thinking through what is required for genuine accountability over time. It is 
to this challenge, and to the interpretation of the GDPR with this aim in 
mind, that we now turn. 
II. SYSTEMIC ACCOUNTABILITY, JUSTIFICATION, AND THE GDPR  
We now turn to the GDPR and the RtE debate that has dominated its 
reception amongst scholars in the U.S. The GDPR, which came into 
effect in May 2018, lays down requirements with respect to the 
information individuals must receive about automated decision-making 
in their case.32 Several recent proposals have followed suit, seeking to 
ensure that machine learning models, which might otherwise be 
uninterpretable, can be explained to those whose lives they will 
 
Elizabeth Denham, Consent Is Not the ‘Silver Bullet’ for GDPR Compliance, INFO. COMM'R 
OFF. NEWS BLOG (August 16, 2017), https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/blog-
consent-is-not-the-silver-bullet-for-gdpr-compliance/. 
32 See generally Kaminski, The Right to Explanation, Explained, supra note 1; Casey et al., 
Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra note 1; Isak Mendoza & Lee Bygrave, The Right Not 
to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling, EU INTERNET L.: REG. AND 
ENFORCEMENT (2017); Bryce Goodman & Seth Flaxman, European Union Regulations on 
Algorithmic Decision Making and a "Right to Explanation," 38 AI MAG. 50, 50–57 (2017); 
Malgieri & Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making Exists in the 
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 6; Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information 
and the Right to Explanation, supra note 23; Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation 
of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, 7 
INT. DATA PRIV. L. 76, 76–99 (2017); Sandra Wachter et al., Counterfactual Explanations 
without Opening the Black Box: Automated Decisions and the GDPR, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
841 (2018). 
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inevitably shape.33 Broadly, the GDPR requires individuals to be 
provided with “meaningful information about the logic involved” in the 
automated decision34 as part of the right to contest these decisions and 
to enforce other rights under the GDPR.35 
There has been fierce disagreement about the scope and content of 
this explainability requirement. The core of the right to explanation in 
the GDPR regime can be found in Article 22 and Articles 13, 14, and 15. 
Article 22 lays down the general assumption against “automated 
individual decision-making, including profiling” and articulates the 
three exceptions to that assumption, while Article 13, Article 14 and 
Article 15 discuss the various transparency rights that arise from the use 
of automated decision-making, including the right to explanation. 
Article 13 creates requirements at the time information is collected from 
an individual, Article 14 focuses on requirements at the time information 
is collected from a third party, and Article 15 creates ongoing 
requirements related to the holding of individuals’ information. These 
Articles bear on cases of decisions “based solely on automated 
processing” which “produce[s] legal effects concerning him or her or 
similarly significantly affects him or her,” as they require the individual 
to be informed of the existence of the automated decision-making and 
for the provision of “meaningful information about the logic involved” 
in the automated decision.36  
Our aim is not to offer another interpretation of this requirement. We 
agree with scholars who have recently argued that the GDPR’s main text 
must be read alongside surrounding ‘soft-law.’37 These include the 
preamble to the Directive, known as the Recitals. These Recitals are not 
strictly binding, but they indicate how the GDPR is likely to be enforced 
and how, therefore, companies are likely to shape their behaviour to 
comply with the GDPR.38 They also include the guidance of the Article 
 
33 See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633 (2017); 
Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra note 5; Edwards & Veale, Slave to the 
Algorithm, supra note 5. 
34 See GDPR arts. 13(2)(f), 14(2)(g) and 15(1)(g). 
35 Selbst and Powles make explicit this connection between providing information and 
individuals enforcing their rights. Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to 
Explanation, supra note 23. 
36 An individual also has the right to contest these decisions under Article 22. GDPR, supra 
note 21. 
37 See generally Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1; Kaminski, The Right to 
Explanation, Explained, supra note 1; Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra 
note 1. 
38 As Kaminski puts it, “[t]hese texts are not technically binding, but they provide clarity of 
what is to come.” Kaminski, supra note 1, at 195; In contrast, Wachter et al., who argue that the 
Recitals are not binding in the case of establishing the right to explanation since they are only 
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29 Working Party (A29WP), an advisory board made up of data 
protection authority representatives of all EU Member States, the 
European Data Protection Supervisor, and the European Commission. 
The purpose of the A29WP and its successor, the European Data 
Protection Board, is to promote consistent application of the GDPR 
across Member States.39 Furthermore, the GDPR is designed to be given 
force by national Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), like many other 
EU Directives. How those institutions interpret its provisions is, in the 
end, what matters. We therefore give particular weight to guidance 
subsequently issued by national DPAs, most notably, the Information 
Commissioner’s Office (ICO) in the U.K.40  
In our view, this accompanying guidance makes it clear that the 
GDPR does contain a right to explanation. But more importantly, that 
guidance should shape how we elaborate on the content and scope of 
that right to explanation. The guidance suggests that the GDPR has 
begun to develop a comprehensive set of provisions for attaining 
systemic accountability over time. What a right to an explanation means 
in the context of the GDPR should depend on how the GDPR aims to 
secure systemic accountability.  
Our aim is to approach the challenge of explainability by keeping in 
mind what is of ultimate importance: holding those with power to 
account, by ensuring that institutions justify their design and use of 
machine learning models to regulatory bodies and to individuals subject 
to their predictions, classifications, and rankings. The appropriate form 
of explanation should depend on who is justifying what to whom, as part 
of the process of accountability. To draw out the implications of this 
argument for interpreting the GDPR, we propose a simple taxonomy of 
justifications. It is broken down by three questions: (1) Who is offering 
 
meant to provide guidance in cases of ambiguity, which is not the case, they argue, with respect 
to Article 22. Moreover, they argue that the Recital could not be used to establish new legal 
rights and duties that do not clearly exist in the text of the Directive. See Wachter, et al., supra 
note 32, at 80.  
39 GDPR replaced the pre-existing EU Directive on privacy, the Data Protection Directive, 
which came into force in 1995, and was suspended when the GDPR became enforceable in 2018. 
40 See generally  ICO, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), U.K. 
INFO. COMM'R OFF. (August 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-the-
general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr-1-0.pdf; See also ICO, Rights Related to Automated 
Decision Making Including Profiling, U.K. INFO. COMM'R OFF. (2017), https://ico.org.uk/for-
organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-
gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-to-automated-decision-making-including-profiling/; see 
also ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection, U.K. INFO. 
COMM'R OFF. (2017), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-
ai-ml-and-data-protection.pdf. 
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the justification?; (2) What is being justified?; and (3) To whom is the 
justification offered? 
 
Who should offer the justification? 
 
We leave this question to one side. It implies distinctions between 
both between engineers who design the model and the institutions that 
use it as part of their decision-making process, and between different 
forms of institutions, such as private and public. We focus on the 
justification of decision-making processes by private institutions. 
 
What should be justified? 
 
1. The machine learning model (overall logic or specific 
predictions); OR 
 
2. The choices an institution makes about the design of a machine 
learning model and its integration into their decision-making 
procedure.  
 
To whom should the justification be offered? 
 
A. An individual subject to the model’s predictions, classifications 
or rankings; OR  
 
B. A regulator or some other type of public oversight body. 
 
We focus on two categories of justification that can be drawn from 
this taxonomy. The first is 1A. The explanation of a machine learning 
model (1) to an individual (A). The second is 2B. The explanation of the 
choices an institution makes in the design and implementation of a 
decision-making procedure (2) to a regulator or some other public 
oversight body (B). Let’s take each in turn. 
The debate about whether the GDPR contains a RtE focuses on the 
1A category. It concerns whether an individual has a right to 
“meaningful information about the logic involved” in a fully automated 
decision which “significantly affects him or her.”41 This has produced a 
range of approaches to explaining machine learning models to 
individuals that would satisfy this requirement, from straightforward 
 
41 Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, supra note 23. 
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counter-factual explanations42 to more complex technical approaches to 
developing interpretable models. These technical approaches aim to 
summarise the logic of a complex machine learning model in a simpler, 
more comprehensible model. Most explain how machine learning 
models work after the fact, known as reverse engineering. These tend to 
either summarise the whole logic of the model, known as global 
approaches, or to explain a specific set of outcomes the model produces, 
known as local approaches.43  
We believe this focus on the 1A category is mistaken. The 1A 
category, the requirement that an institution explain how its machine 
learning model works to an individual subject to those decisions, is not 
a satisfactory way of holding institutions to account. Knowing what the 
rules are is not itself a check on the power of those who decide what the 
rules are. The category mistakenly characterises a challenge of 
institutional justification as a challenge of algorithmic explanation. 
Focusing on the requirement of those with power to inform subjects as 
to what the rules are, intentionally or not, distracts from the higher-order 
question of what the rules should be. If Facebook offers a tool that 
allows an individual to understand why their News Feed shows them 
what it does, the danger is that the user feels as though Facebook has 
justified its more general choices about how it distributes information 
on News Feed. It has in fact done nothing of the sort. It suits Facebook 
for the debate to focus on how they can develop technical explanations 
of News Feed’s ranking models, rather than on the principles Facebook 
chooses to impose on its content moderation systems. The latter draws 
attention to Facebook’s underlying power to decide who sees what, and 
why.  
Nor is the 1A category a satisfactory interpretation of the GDPR’s 
most important provisions. The GDPR contains important mechanisms 
for systemic accountability, which focus on forcing an institution to 
 
42 See Wachter et al., supra note 32, at 854. 
43 See generally Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box 
Models, 51 ACM COMPUTING SURVEYS 1, 1–42 (2018); Philip Adler et al., Auditing Black-Box 
Models for Indirect Influence, 54 KNOWLEDGE AND INFO. SYS. 95, 95–122 (2018); Selbst and 
Barocas supra note 3; Zachary Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, CORNELL UNIV. 
(2017), https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.03490; Kroll et al., supra note 33; Jatinder Singh et al., 
Responsibility & Machine Learning: Part of a Process (Working Paper, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2860048; Marco T. Ribeiro et al., Why Should I Trust You?: 
Explaining the Predictions of Any Classifier, 22 ACM 1135, 1135–1144 (2016); Tameru 
Hailesilassie, Rule Extraction Algorithm for Deep Neural Networks: A Review, 14 INT'L J. 
COMP. SCI. & INFO. SEC. 376, 376–380 (2016); Anupam Datta et al. Algorithmic Transparency 
via Quantitative Input Influence: Theory and Experiments with Learning Systems, 37 
IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIV. 598, 598–617 (2016). 
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justify their choices in the design and implementation of algorithmic 
decision-making systems, including their broader policy and 
commercial aims. Read in conjunction with the accompanying guidance 
of the Recitals, and the guidance published by A29WP and the ICO, the 
GDPR contains provisions that have the potential to transform the ex-
ante process of designing machine learning models and integrating them 
into the decision-making systems of a range of important institutions. It 
sets out clear mechanisms for structuring systemic accountability, to 
ensure institutions justify the choices they make in that process. These 
include empowered DPAs, broad Data Protection Impact Assessments 
(DPIAs), auditing, and ethical review boards.44 
This section uses our taxonomy of justifications to explore what this 
broader, more expansive reading of the GDPR implies for various forms 
of explanation. We contrast our 1A and 2B categories—the explanation 
of a machine learning model to an individual and the explanation of the 
decisions made in the design and implementation of that model to a 
regulator—to explore what is wrong with the more limited readings of 
the GDPR’s provisions. The aim is to learn some broader lessons about 
the governance of institutions designing decision-making systems that 
use machine learning.  
A. What Should Be Justified: Institutions and the Process of Machine 
Learning 
We first focus on what it is that should be justified in the process of 
securing systemic accountability in the governance of algorithmic 
decision-making. If it is the machine learning model itself that must be 
justified, it would seem to follow that such a justification depends on an 
explanation of how the model works, either in terms of its overall logic or 
some subset of specific predictions.  
This reasoning is mistaken, but it is encouraged by the text of the 
GDPR itself. Article 22 focuses on decisions “based solely” on automated 
data processing. The question of what exactly this means has divided 
scholars. Some have argued that decision-making procedures which 
involve humans in some perfunctory way would be exempt from Article 
 
44 See Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 208 ("Accompanied 
by other company duties in the GDPR—including establishing data protection officers, using 
data protection impact assessments, and following the principles of data protection by design—
this regime, if enforced, has the potential to be a sea change in how algorithmic decision-making 
is regulated in the EU.").  
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22’s requirements.45 Much more persuasively, others argue that human 
involvement must be meaningful, as the A29WP guidance states, 
involving a person who has the “authority and competence to change the 
decision.”46 Article 22 in fact creates a strong presumption, or even 
prohibition, against solely automated decision-making, subject to three 
exceptions.47 The GDPR intends to target decision-making systems that 
are fully automated, those which are, for instance, wholly constituted by a 
machine learning model. The right to explanation applies to these cases 
only.48 
Articles 13, 14, and 15 then require that the data controller provide 
information about “the logic involved” in the automated decision-making. 
Here again, the language of the text itself is ambiguous. It is likely that 
this involves a requirement to explain the logic of the whole machine 
learning model rather than a subset of the predictions it produces.49 If so, 
the GDPR is broader than other legal requirements to explain automated 
decisions, such as the requirement in the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) that an applicant be provided a “statement of specific reasons for 
the action taken.”50 The ECOA requirement focuses on the individual 
outcome only, while the GDPR arguably requires a broader form of 
explanation. 
This would seem to produce a view of the resulting right to explanation 
that falls squarely within the 1A category. The GDPR, on this view, 
requires an explanation of the logic of an entire machine learning model, 
 
45 See Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making 
Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 32, at 88 ("Quite 
crucially, this creates a loophole whereby even nominal involvement of a human in the decision-
making process allows for an otherwise automated mechanism to avoid invoking elements of 
the right of access."). 
46 See Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines, supra note 1, at 171 ("According to 
the A29WP, companies must ensure that any human 'oversight of [a] decision is meaningful, 
rather than just a token gesture' if they intend for their systems to fall outside the scope of Article 
22’s provisions pertaining to decisions 'based solely on automated processing.'"). 
47 These exceptions are: consent, contract, or if authorised by Union or member state law. 
See Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 197-198 (describing the 
three exceptions to the Article 22 right and prohibition); Isak Mendoza and Lee A. Bygrave, The 
Right Not to Be Subject to Automated Decisions Based on Profiling 14 (U. OSLO FAC. L. LEGAL 
STUDIES, Research Paper No. 2017-20, 2017) (providing the exceptions to the Article 22 right). 
48 “Interpreting Article 22 as a prohibition rather than a right to be invoked means that 
individuals are automatically protected from the potential effects this type of processing may 
have.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-Making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (Feb. 6, 2018), at 20 
[hereinafter A29WP]. Also note that, according to the Guidelines, the exceptions in Article 22 
should be interpreted narrowly. Id. at 13. 
49 See Selbst & Powles, Meaningful Information and the Right to Explanation, supra note 
23, at 236. 
50 12 C.F.R. § 1002.9(a)(2)(i). 
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where that model constitutes the whole decision-making procedure that 
results in legal or similarly significant effects on a data subject.  
This is not only a limited reading of the provisions and intent of the 
GDPR, it also completely misunderstands the role that explanation should 
play in a broader system for structuring accountability in the governance 
of algorithmic decision-making. Machine learning is a way of establishing 
a decision-making procedure. It is best thought of as a process, one that 
involves choices at every stage. These choices are made by institutions 
who design and integrate machine learning models into their decision-
making procedures. These choices profoundly shape the form the machine 
learning model takes, the role it plays in their decision-making procedures, 
and the effects those decisions have on individuals over time. We believe 
that the RtE should be read in the context of the GDPR’s broader 
provisions for mechanisms to secure accountability over time. These focus 
on the ex-ante design and implementation of decision-making procedures 
using machine learning.51  
There are three crucial choices in the process of machine learning itself 
that must be considered, along with a broader set of choices about the role 
the machine learning model plays in the decision-making procedure, and 
the policy or commercial aims the institution has in deploying it. 
 
1. Outcome of Interest 
 
First, the outcome of interest is what the machine learning model looks 
for, that is, what it predicts, ranks, or classifies. The selection of an 
outcome of interest very often embeds important moral and political 
choices, which profoundly shape the predictions, classifications, or 
rankings the model will produce.52 This choice, and the reasons for making 
it, require justification. 
 
2. Training Data 
 
Second, the training data set is what the machine learning models from. 
Recent research has developed several technical approaches to the 
evaluation of fairness in training data.53 There are multiple aspects to the 
selection and construction of a training dataset, all of which can be 
 
51 See infra note 52.  
52 See generally Cary Coglianese and David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative 
Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L. J. 1147 (2017). 
53 See generally Rich Zemel et al., Learning Fair Representations, 2013 INT'L CONF. MACH. 
LEARNING 325 (2013); J. Henry Hinnefeld et al., Evaluating Fairness Metrics in the Presence 
of Dataset Bias, CORNELL UNIV. (Sept. 24, 2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1809.09245. 
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extremely important in shaping the predictions of the resulting machine 
learning model. These range from choices about time periods, 




Third, the features included in a machine learning model. This includes 
choices about whether to include or exclude protected traits, such as race 
and gender. Removing a protected trait from a model is neither necessary 
nor sufficient to prevent discrimination in machine learning. In fact, 
preventing discrimination may require that information about individual 
membership of protected groups be included in machine learning models; 
fairness might require awareness, not blindness.54 It also includes choices 
about whether to simplify the model by reducing the number of 
variables.55  
Accountability requires justification. The form of explanation that 
justification requires depends on who is justifying what to whom. The 
GDPR is concerned with holding to account institutions which use 
automated decision-making procedures in important spheres.56 Technical 
explanations of the logic of a machine learning model to an isolated 
individual will not be conducive to the kind of ongoing accountability the 
GDPR requires. The very form a machine learning model takes depends 
on choices made by humans in its design and implementation. The notion 
of providing a technical explanation of a machine learning model 
completely obscures the important and prior question: How did the rules 
that govern the operation of the automated decision come to be what they 
are? That is a question about the justification of institutional choices which 
is both prior to and much more significant than the question of what the 
 
54 See generally Cynthia Dwork et al., Fairness through Awareness, 2012 PROC. 
INNOVATIONS. IN THEORETICAL COMPUT. SCI. 214 (2012); Talia B. Gillis and Jann L. Spiess, 
Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459, 471 (2019); Symposium, Nina Grgic -
Hlaca et al., The Case for Process Fairness in Learning: Feature Selection for Fair Decision 
Making, 29 CONF. ON NEURAL INFO. PROCESSING SYS. (2016). 
55 Veale et al. describe a case in which the performance target of 75 percent was specified 
in advance, so the number of features could be reduced from 18,000 to 200, then 20, then 8, 
“because it’s important to see how it works, we believe.” Michael Veale, Max Van Kleek, and 
Reuben Binns, Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic Support in High-
Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making 440, PROC. OF THE 2018 CHI. CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS 
IN COMP. SYS. (2018), http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.01029. 
56 For instance, the ‘spheres’ in which DPIAs might be required are described as ‘high-risk’ 
in the text. The A29WP guidance lists a set of concrete criteria that make clear the broad scope 
of what ‘high-risk’ might mean. See Casey et al., supra note 1, at 176 ("Article 35(7) of the 
GDPR enumerates four basic features that all DPIAs must, at a minimum, contain."); A29WP, 
supra note 48. 
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rules are. It is also, we have argued, a question to which the GDPR’s 
provisions aim to elicit an answer.  
This is precisely what the A29WP guidance states. The guidance 
explains that “the complexity of machine-learning” algorithms “can make 
it challenging to understand how an automated decision-making process 
or profiling works.”57 Such complexity, the guidance continues, “is no 
excuse for failing to provide information.”58 Companies whose decisions 
are subject to the provisions of Article 22 “should find simple ways to tell 
the data subject about the rationale behind, or the criteria relied on in 
reaching the decision,” “not necessarily a complex explanation of the 
algorithms used or [a] disclosure of the full algorithm.”59 The guidance 
further clarifies that this will include information used in the decision-
making process, including: categories of data; the source of that 
information; how many profiles were constructed and used in the 
procedure; and how that profile is used for a decision about the data 
subject.60  
Institutions always make choices about how to design and integrate 
machine learning models into their decision-making procedures. In these 
choices lie trade-offs about discrimination and fairness, who wins and who 
loses, along with a host of other normative and epistemological 
assumptions. It is for these choices that an institution must be held 
accountable. The GDPR’s provisions for a RtE must be understood in this 
context. Surrounding guidance makes clear that the appropriate form of 
explanation is not specifically about the logic of the machine learning 
model, but the choices an institution made in designing and integrating it 
into their decision-making system.61 
B. To Whom Should the Justification Be Offered: Regulators and 
Citizens 
There is also confusion about to whom the justification is owed. Here 
again, the language of the GDPR is not helpful. The GDPR text itself does 
not explain the aims of a RtE. However, the guidelines explain that “the 
data subject will only be able to challenge a decision or express their view 
 
57 Id. at 25. 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 31.  
61 For a useful overview of the kinds of choices that might be required for the form of 
justification at which the GDPR aims, which they term ‘legibility,’ See generally Gianclaudio 
Malgieri and Giovanni Comandé, Why a Right to Legibility of Automated Decision-Making 
Exists in the General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 6.  
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if they fully understand how it has been made and on what basis.”62 The 
emphasis on the ability to challenge the decision reflects the fact that on 
this view, the purpose of the explanation is to invoke a data subject’s other 
fundamental rights. As Kaminski puts it, “[i]ndividual transparency 
provisions, as the guidelines make clear, are intended to empower 
individuals to invoke their rights under the GDPR.”63 
We think this is a problem not with scholarly interpretations of the 
GDPR, but with the reasoning of the text itself and the guidelines 
surrounding it. The idea that the disclosure of information produces the 
enforcement of rights is not supported by evidence. Other areas of 
consumer behaviour research suggest people often struggle understanding 
straightforward information about products and how they pertain to their 
personal information.64 The GDPR’s instrumental individual transparency 
approach goes one step further, assuming that individuals will not only 
understand the information they are provided, but also that they will 
recognize violations of their legal rights and act on them.65 Furthermore, 
many of the fundamental concerns about using machine learning to make 
decisions – most notably those related to bias and discrimination – can 
only be understood with a systematic and aggregate analysis of the 
decision-making procedure. The explanation of an individual decision to 
an isolated individual will not enable this kind of aggregate analysis; in 
fact, it may even obscure demands for obtaining it. The GDPR’s account 
of the instrumental aim of an individual RtE is not convincing.  
If systemic accountability is placed front and centre, rather than 
individual rights, it is clear that institutional justification of decision-
making procedures must be offered to empowered, well-resourced 
regulators. There are ample provisions in the GDPR for doing just this. 
The individual RtE should not distract or detract from these provisions for 
systemic accountability. Rather, as we have consistently argued, the RtE 
should be viewed as a means to this broader end.  
A focus on systemic accountability produces a very different view of 
the kind of explanations a regulator might require from an institution. We 
believe that at minimum, an explanation that supports the form of 
justification required by systemic accountability would answer the 
following questions. In all cases, the institution must not only provide a 
satisfactory answer to the question, it must provide reasons for the answers 
 
62 A29WP, supra note 48, at 27. 
63 Kaminski, The Right to Be Explained, Explained, supra note 1, at 211. 
64 See supra note 24. See also Oren Bar-Gill and Kevin Davis, (Mis)perceptions of Law in 
Consumer Markets, AM. L. & ECON. REV. (2017) (discussing misperceptions of the law, which 
is an additional reason that disclosures alone may be insufficient). 
65 See Edwards & Veale, Enslaving the Algorithm, supra note 5, at 52. 
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given. Where relevant, answers could be accompanied by quantitative data 
and analysis.  
 
1. What are the goals of the decision-making procedure?  
 
2. What are the company policies that constrain or inform the 
decision-making procedure, including the role machine learning 
plays within it? 
 
3. How did the company define the outcome of interest the machine 
learning model was trained to predict? Why? 
 
4. How did the company select and construct the data on which the 
model was trained? If relevant, how was the data labelled and by 
whom? Was the impact of using other training data considered? 
 
5. What features did the company choose to include or excluded in 
the model? Why? 
 
6. Does the decision-making procedure involve human discretion? 
How precisely do the automated and human element of the 
decision-making procedure interact? Has the company considered 
how this interaction effects aggregate outcomes? 
 
7. Has the lender considered how this interaction affects 
decisions?66   
 
The GDPR has ample mechanisms for encouraging, if not requiring, 
companies to answer these questions. As Kaminski argues, rather than 
“arguing over” the “instrumental value of individual notice, or publicly 
releasing source code,” we should be debating how to obtain structured 
“accountability across a firm’s decision-making, over time.”67  
Consider Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs).68 DPIA’s are 
a “process for building and demonstrating” compliance by systematically 
 
66 For an alternative and insightful list of questions, see generally Malgieri and Comandé, 
supra note 6, at 29-30.  
67 Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 35. 
68 There are others mechanisms in the GDPR for attaining systemic accountability, such as 
auditing and ethical review boards. See e.g. Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 8 
("The instrumental rationale for regulating algorithmic decision-making counsels that regulation 
should try to correct these problems, often by using systemic accountability mechanisms, such 
as ex ante technical requirements, audits, or oversight boards, to do so."); Kroll et al., supra note 
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examining how automated decision-making procedures are designed and 
implemented. They are meant to be an “iterative process” that fall within 
the GDPR’s broader “data protection by design” principles, which apply 
throughout the design, implementation and monitoring of a decision-
making procedure.69 DPIAs are more than simple recommendations of 
best practice. They are intended to apply to a broad range of institutions 
which use data to make important decisions. Importantly, those decisions 
must not be solely automated. As the A29WP guidance states, DPIAs 
apply “in the case of decision-making including profiling with legal or 
similarly significant effects that is not wholly automated, as well as solely 
automated decision-making defined in Article 22(1).”70 Where appropriate, 
companies should “seek the views of data subjects or their representatives” 
during the DPIA process.71 And companies should explain their reasons 
for making the choices they did in the design and implementation of their 
models.  
In this context, the scope and content of the RtE is much broader. As 
Casey et al. argue, the right to explanation “is no mere remedial 
mechanism to be invoked by data subjects on an individual basis, but 
implies a more general form of oversight with broad implications for the 
design, prototyping, field testing, and deployment of data processing 
systems.”72 We agree with Veale and Edwards that ex ante DPIAs will 
“become the required norm for algorithmic systems, especially where 
sensitive personal data, such as race or political opinion is processed on a 
large scale.”73 
This is as it should be. The form of explanation required for 
institutional justification will often not be the technical explanation of the 
logic of machine learning models to isolated individuals. This is the 1A 
 
33, at  660 ("Beyond transparency, auditing is another strategy for verifying how a computer 
system works."); Selbst & Barocas, supra note 3, at 1133 ("The most common trigger of the 
latter is a lawsuit, in which documents can be obtained and scrutinized and witnesses can be 
deposed or examined on the stand, but auditing requirements are another possibility."). 
69 See Casey et al. supra note 1, at 172-173; A29WP, supra note 48, at 29 (“As a key 
accountability tool, a DPIA enables the controller to assess the risks involved in automated 
decision-making, including profiling. It is a way of showing that suitable measures have been 
put in place to address those risks and demonstrate compliance with the GDPR.”). 
70 Id. at 32 ("The following list, though not exhaustive, provides some good practice 
suggestions for controllers to consider when making solely automated decisions . . . ."). See also 
Casey et al., supra note 1, at 174 (According to the Regulation, DPIAs are mandatory '[w]here 
a type of processing[,] taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of the 
processing, is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.'") 
(internal citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 36.  
72 Id. at 39. 
73 Edwards & Veale, Slave to the Algorithm?, supra note 5, at 78. 
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category. Rather, it should be an explanation of the decisions an institution 
made in the design of a machine learning model and its integration into 
their decision-making procedure, to an empowered regulator. This is the 
2B category. Reporting to a regulator rather than to an individual is 
necessary to reveal aggregate patterns and effects that are not discoverable 
when considering a decision in isolation.74 Regulators and other public 
bodies have the technical knowledge, skills and time to evaluate 
information that an individual does not.75 The very purpose of regulators 
is to take actions in situations when it is individually not worthwhile, but 
is socially desirable.  
CONCLUSION 
The RtE debate should begin with the foundational goal: 
accountability. Accountability is constitutive of democratic self-
governance. It is an integral aspect of a citizenry’s ongoing authorization 
of the complex decision-making systems which shape their lives. Part of 
what it means to be a citizen of a self-governing polity is to give and 
receive justifications of those decision-making systems. Explanations are 
 
74 One of us has written about this type of aggregate analysis elsewhere when considering 
the type of information a lender would provide to the CFPB to allow testing of whether credit 
pricing algorithms are compliant with discrimination law. See generally Talia B. Gillis & Jann 
L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019). In the context of credit 
pricing discrimination, this has been one of the most significant barriers to a successful 
discrimination complaint. The passing of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act in 1975, increased 
the ability to bring a successful discrimination claim and class action against lender since the 
Act mandated the disclosure of mortgage applications and their outcomes, allowing for an 
aggregate consideration of mortgage decisions. See e.g. Robert G. Schwemm & Calvin 
Bradford, Proving Disparate Impact in Fair Housing Cases after Inclusive Communities, 19 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 685, 713-15 (2016). 
75 Future technical research into explainability and interpretability in machine learning 
could benefit from assuming that the appropriate audience for their approaches is not isolated 
individuals but regulators. The great strength of Dwork’s ‘individual fairness’ approach is that 
it isolates the normative choices and therefore makes possible a form of accountability, e.g. fair 
affirmative action, through the choice of the distance metric. It can require access to protected 
status information during the design phase, usually explicitly prohibited, which may require a 
big shift in policy. What matters though is a procedure which justifies the choice of the distance 
metric, which can be explained to either a regulator or, in some cases, those who are actually 
subject to the decision. See Dwork et al., supra note 54, at 2 (describing the "[c]onnection 
between individual fairness and group fairness," Dwork et al. state that "[s]tatistical parity is the 
property that the demographics of those receiving positive (or negative) classifications are 
identical to the demographics of the population as a whole. Statistical parity speaks to group 
fairness rather than individual fairness, and appears desirable, as it equalizes outcomes across 
protected and non-protected groups."); see also id. at 3 (“Justifying the availability of or access 
to the distance metric in various settings is one of the most challenging aspects of our framework, 
and in reality the metric used will most likely only be society’s current best approximation to 
the truth.”). 
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valuable insofar as they are required to achieve systemic accountability 
over time. In practice, this means that the appropriate form of explanation 
will depend on who is justifying what to whom. We have argued that the 
RtE debate focuses far too much on the explanation of the logic of a 
machine learning model to isolated individuals. What matters for 
accountability is the justification by an institution of the choices it made 
in the design and implementation of a machine learning model. The form 
of systemic accountability should drive the form of institutional 
justification, which in turn, should drive the appropriate form of 
explanation.  
Interpreting the GDPR matters because it is likely to shape future 
regulation of algorithmic decision-making. The primary concerns that 
arise when using machine learning to make, or assist with, important 
decisions are not satisfactorily addressed by focusing on the rights of 
isolated individuals, or the logic of an individual machine learning model 
itself. As we develop comprehensive governance structures to address the 
concerns that arise from the use of machine learning in decision-making, 
we should move beyond frameworks that rely on the individual 
enforcement of rights, and towards those which develop a systemic 
approach to establishing and maintaining accountability within a complex 
modern democracy.  
This means moving beyond privacy as a lens through which to view 
the governance of algorithmic decision-making. Some of the limited ways 
in which the GDPR has been interpreted have been transplanted from older 
debates about privacy. This is partly because the GDPR itself grew out of 
earlier privacy provisions and it is partly because scholars who interpret it 
often cut their cloth in the privacy field. The focus on individual rights, as 
well as the notice and consent framework that underpins the GDPR’s 
approach, are all characteristic of approaches to addressing concerns about 
privacy. As Kaminski puts it, “the strong system of individual rights” 
within the GDPR may come “at the cost of correcting systemic problems 
essential for achieving accountability in modern democracies.”76 If the 
RtE is interpreted as requiring explanations of the logic of machine 
learning models to isolated individuals, these explanations are not likely 
to be useful to regulators in evaluating whether to accept the justification 
of an institution of its decision-making procedure. That is, such 
 
76 Kaminski, Binary Governance, supra note 1, at 74. This also means relating current 
discussions about the governance of algorithmic decision-making to a rich literature on 
regulatory strategies in an administrative state. See e.g. id. at 30-31 (“If there is already concern 
in administrative law over insulating government bureaucrats from electoral and judicial 
oversight, collaborative governance compounds such concerns by involving private parties.”) 
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explanations may actually obstruct systemic accountability. Most 
challenging of all, the GDPR requires companies to assist in the 
enforcement of citizens’ fundamental rights. This effectively privatizes the 
protection of individual rights. The GDPR and the literature surrounding 
it has no satisfactory account of how its provisions are to be subject to 
democratic oversight. Accountability matters because it is constitutive of 
collective self-government. Future regulatory provisions must focus more 
directly on developing mechanisms within modern democracies that can 
secure accountability in the governance of algorithmic decision-making 
systems. 
We are currently in a moment of choice. We are choosing how to 
integrate humanity’s most powerful decision-making tool – machine 
learning – into a range of complex human activities. We have argued that 
institutional justification, not algorithmic explanation, is essential to the 
accountability constitutive of democratic self-government. The technical 
explanation of machine learning models is never sufficient, is often not 
necessary, and sometimes actively distracts from, the justification of the 
decision-making systems of which they are a part. We must think through 
what it means to reason about the justifications an institution should offer 
for its choices in how and why it constructed its decision-making 
procedure in the way it did – that is, a justification of why the rules are 
what they are. We have offered a sketch of what such a system of reasoning 
might look like.  
We must keep our eyes on the right prize. That prize is accountability. 
Institutional power is held in check by other institutions with the authority 
and resources sufficient to hold them to account. To attain that prize 
requires a laser-like focus on choice in the face of apparent technical 
inevitability. In this case, it means requiring institutions to justify their 
choices about how they have constructed their decision-making systems. 
Not being distracted by whizzy technical explanations of their machine 
learning models work – or even, of that most dangerous of terms, artificial 
intelligence. 
 
